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Instrumental Borders of Gender and Religious
Conversion in the Balkans*
ALBERT DOJA
ABSTRACT
In this paper I look at religious identiﬁcations and afﬁliations in the Balkans as instrumental
political resources for ascertaining hierarchical relations among social groups and individuals, with
extensive use of gendered metaphors, referring to different categories of people as either effeminate
or truly manly, and actual women often used as a currency of exchange.
A Gendered Ethno-Religious Ideology
More than anything else, the Balkans is a place of passages, encounters and contacts,
formidable in its capability of hybridising Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism and Islam.
However, a generalised view on Southeast European cultures and societies, especially
in the case of Albania, would underscore regional diﬀerences between mountains and
plains, between life-worlds shaped by diﬀerent religious cultures, and between
diﬀerent social and economic settings, urban and rural, especially as far as their
impact on gender relations is concerned.
In the Balkans, as elsewhere, religious conversion and politics have normally related
to a collective history, which embraced social and cultural communities, or more
precisely, members of a family, a lineage, a village or a larger group. Before, during
and after the heyday of islamicisation in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, one
converted either to Islam or to Christianity because of belonging to a social network.
Conversion and religious belonging or aﬃliation are therefore part of a process of
socialisation through the pursuit of a collective identity. Collective representations
and beliefs, ritual practices and ceremonies are considered part of the oﬃcial religion –
Christianity or Islam accordingly – of a given local community or social network,
regardless of whether a particular cultural trait does or does not form part of the
world religion in question. They are categorised collectively not as religious features of
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an established world belief system but as part of ‘an ancestral legacy of traditions and
customs’. Belonging to a religion means belonging to a social group.
In the case of religious diﬀerences, however, a discontinuity exists up to the present
day between the actual social organisation and the discourses of the actors themselves
about society and social behaviour. When one listens to discourses of this kind in
Albania, for instance, this discontinuity usually seems to be considerable, and one can
sometimes gain the impression of a total rupture between Christians and Muslims. On
the other hand, empirical observations at the level of any local community reveal
between Christians and Muslims not only a perfectly inclusive community of
language, of course, but also a very broad inclusive community of modes of existence
and of cultural behaviours. Although an individual may share group prejudices
towards other religious groups, the essential group values are deﬁned by a system of
kinship and matrimonial alliances, of solidarity and hostility, of status and social
position, which is common to many social communities regardless of religion. Being
Muslim or Christian is based on the particular family, kinship, territorial or social
group, which by tradition relates to religious ‘belonging’ or adherence. It is not based
on a speciﬁc belief system or religious conviction; rather it is grounded in the social
culture. Religion is a conformity, which is transmitted throughout the community
(Doja, 2000).
A consequence of the foregoing is that where many see the opposition between
religious groups as a cause or an explanation of certain historical developments in the
Balkans, we must on the contrary see it as an eﬀect of those developments. The
conceptualisation of the categories of ‘Christian’ or ‘Muslim’ is necessarily related to
social, political, territorial, ethnic, gender, and many other levels of identiﬁcation. An
important feature of this type of conceptualisation is a dichotomising populist logic in
political and cultural discourse which often involves a fallacy of metonymic
misrepresentation throughout the Balkans. The oppositional conceptualisation
between Christians and Muslims is part of a series of antithetical pairs such as
highlander/lowlander, urban/rural, conqueror/conquered, oppressor/oppressed, auto-
chthonous/heterochthonous, moral/immoral, pure/impure, all of which are signiﬁ-
cantly represented by the categories of masculine/feminine and male/female (Sofos,
1996; Zhivkovic, 1997). These pairs of opposites, a consequence of the existence of
sexist, masculinist cultural elements, are available to be pinned conspicuously on
diﬀerent groups of people regardless of the actual ascriptions in order to exalt or
debase their identities. This kind of characterisation of whole territorial and religious
groups as bearers of one or another mentality may be identiﬁed as ‘Balkanism’
(Todorova, 1997) and partakes in the logic of many ‘nesting orientalisms’ (Bakic-
Hayden, 1995).
Any given dichotomy may, what is more, be refracted recursively, its meaning
ampliﬁed over and over again to be used in more and more bloody contexts of
conﬂict, as can be seen, for example, in the perception of any conversion to Islam as a
betrayal of Christian ‘blood’ and Christian ‘milk’, which have entailed a transforma-
tion from Slavic to Turkic blood and race.
Conversion to Islam has always been a sensitive issue, widely exploited in literature,
particularly in epic poetry. Certain infamous masterpieces of Balkan literature, from
the work of the early nineteenth-century Montenegrin poet and bishop Petar Njegosˇ
to that of the twentieth-century Yugoslavian Nobel prize-winner Ivo Andric´, have
been inﬂuential in this regard. As portrayed in such works, this kind of ethno-religious
ideology excludes all Slavic Muslims from the ‘people’ and demonstrates what can be
done to those deﬁned as non-people and what, under certain circumstances, is a
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religious duty and a sacred, cleansing act. Such nationalist religious discourse, levelled
against Slavic Muslims’ natal milk and against their procreating faculty, curses them
to disappear, not only as ‘cowardly and covetous’ and the ‘heathen element of a young
race’, but ﬁnally as the corrupted ‘Orient’ that has cut oﬀ the Slavic race from the
‘civilizing currents’ of the West (Sells, 1996).
A number of studies have explored cross-culturally the ways the ethno-religious
community has been imagined and legitimated according to gendered metaphors of
reproduction and kinship, and the ways religious and nationalist politics have been
structured with reference to gender (Mosse, 1985; Yuval-Davis, 1997; Goldstein, 2001;
Nagel, 2003). Serbian nationalist populism in particular has emphasised a number of
gendered dichotomies which shape social relations by setting ‘real Serbs’ not only
against Bosnian ‘traitors’ who have converted to Islam in particular, but also against
fantasised virile but ‘bestial’ and ‘evil incarnate’ Albanians, against ‘emasculated’
Serbian bureaucrats and communists, against ‘eﬀeminate’ Serbian peace activists, or
against ‘hormonally challenged’ opponents to the Milosˇevic´ line (Salecl, 1994).
Drawing upon a masculinist deﬁnition of the nation, an important discursive strategy
has been employed in the positing of the category of the ‘feminine’ and the ‘eﬀeminate’
to include virtually everyone not conforming to the accepted ‘nationalised’ versions of
masculinity or to the ‘gendered’ versions of national identity.
It is the increasing role of traditionalist and nationalist discourses that makes it
possible for religion subsequently to get converted into nationalist consciousness, for
this consciousness to become organised and for organised nationalism to become
militarist, masculinist, misogynist, racist and violent. Nationalist projects may indeed
mobilise a traditionalist discourse towards social construction of gender and religion,
the result of which is to en-gender the war, on the basis of an assumed and reiﬁed
moral order and gendered ethno-religious ideology.
Instrumentality of Gender and Religious Categories
A further phenomenon is that the discursive valencies of the opposite poles of a pair of
terms often get reversed; indeed, the whole range of opposed pairs of terms can be
given a whole spectrum of variously shaded valuations. Depending on who is talking
to whom, when, under what circumstances, and for what purpose, the permutations
and combinations, sometimes seemingly logically inconsistent, of territorial, religious
or gendered ethno-psychological distinctions can assume dizzying complexity.
Lowlanders and urban people can be seen as rational, pragmatic and cultivated, or
obversely as degenerate, soft and submissive; highlanders and rural people can be
seen as brave, proud, of superior mettle, or obversely as violent, primitive and
arrogant. In this process of identity construction spatial, religious and gendered
borders are constantly ethnicised and politicised to express symbolic cultural borders,
a process which is particularly ampliﬁed in periods of suddenly disruptive social
change such as the ethnic wars in former Yugoslavia or the postcommunist turbulence
in Albania.
Generally, in Albania one frequently encounters mutual perceptions expressed in
dichotomies of ‘primitive’ versus ‘civilised’, and ‘faithful’ or ‘honourable’ versus
‘unfaithful’ and ‘treacherous’. Southern Albanians would conceive of the northern
mountain people as ‘primitive’ and of themselves as ‘civilised’. By contrast, northern
Albanians, especially Catholics, would conceive of Albanian Muslims as ‘unfaithful’,
relating this prominently to their religious conversion in history. They would also tend
to label all southern Albanians of Orthodox religion as potentially ‘unfaithful’ because
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of prevalent conspiracy theories in which identiﬁcation with Greek expansionist plans
would make them potential traitors (see Schwandner-Sievers, 2002).
More speciﬁcally, against the ‘delicacy’ and the ‘civilised culture’ of certain
categories of people, the behaviour of people of opposite categories is often taken to
be ‘fanatical’, a mark of their backwardness. Representations of fanaticism often
relate to religious matters, but ﬁrst and foremost they relate to the context of family
relations, with a more marked subordination of women to male authority perceived as
a feature of fanaticism. Of course, such representations may well have no relations to
real practices, and in mixed local communities Christians and Muslims may make the
same representations about each other, always with a certain shift in relation to
reality. Diﬀerent communities within one religion may also represent each other as
fanatical. The Muslims in southern Albania, for instance, are rather prompt to
denounce the fanaticism of certain other groups of Muslims whom they perceive as
‘opposite’ according to one or another criterion. They often perceive their own
coexistence with Christians in southern Albania, for example, as a mark and a cause
of their ‘cultural ﬁnesse’ in comparison with the Muslims of the rural or mountain
areas of northern Albania, a superiority which they see as also necessarily implied in
their gender relations (Rapper, 2002).
Matrimonial relations between Christians and Muslims are often deﬁned by the
endogamy of the religious community. In local communities with a large Muslim
majority Christians may want to comply with rules on religious endogamy, but they
will also be limited by the rules of exogamy which prohibit them to marry cousins up
to several distant degrees, either on the father’s or the mother’s side. This is why many
Christian women marry in the cities, which are perceived as ‘Christian’: they have very
little chance of ﬁnding a permitted spouse in their village. Young women who leave to
pursue graduate studies in the city also tend to remain there and not to return to the
village to ﬁnd a spouse. All this reinforces the bonds that Christians maintain with the
cities and contributes to their image of ‘culture’ and ‘modernity’: qualities which are
attributed, as anywhere, to the large urban centres.
In anthropological terms, religious endogamy manifests itself primarily in a refusal
to give wives rather than a refusal to take them. In this sense Christian endogamy in
Albania is stricter than Muslim endogamy insofar as Christians are even more
resistant than Muslims to being givers, while agreeing to be takers, which marks a
relative superiority of Christians in relation to Muslims. In the majority of mixed
couples the husband is a Christian and the wife a Muslim. The reverse happens much
more rarely, and Christian women married to Muslims are in general from distant
mountain areas, and are thus external to local opposition between Christians and
Muslims. In this situation, the takers of wives are valorised. Christian men are proud
of the fact that they can take Muslim wives, whereas Muslims complain that the
Christians take their daughters but refuse to give theirs to them (Rapper, 2002).
The current situation is however the reverse of the situation that prevailed before
independence, that is, at the time of the institutional pre-eminence of Muslims within
the framework of Ottoman society. For Muslims to take Christian wives was quite a
common practice in the Ottoman Empire. Under Islamic law it is permissible for a
Muslim man to marry a Christian woman, though not for a Muslim woman to marry
a non-Muslim. However, such issues of legalistic religion have never been, and are still
not today, of major concern to the religious mind of Albanians. In the quasi-
autonomous regions of North Albania, for instance, powerful staunch Catholics are
regularly reported to have married Muslim women during the nineteenth century; the
women were expected to abandon Islam upon marriage (Whitaker, 1968).
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In the pre-modern Balkan highlands in particular, both unmarried males and
unmarried females might have found themselves as much the victims of family politics
as the hapless members of royal houses in the Middle Ages. Questions of family
advantage – not religious aﬃliation per se – were the guiding issues when the time
came for a man to be married, and the senior members of his extended family would
examine the matter so that the union most advantageous to the group as a whole
could be arranged. The rights and interests of women would not be consulted, and
many women still describe their arranged marriages and accept them as the norm (see
Post, 1998). Among the many things to be negotiated, often the least problematic was
to expect that the woman would change her religious faith to conform to that of her
husband.
It seems reasonable to assume in any case that the present orientation of
matrimonial strategies is rather a recent one, which corresponds to a new political
situation and is part of the concept of ‘culture’ that underlies them. At the beginning
of the twentieth century, shortly after independence, the tendency was already
reversed. Even though religious intermarriages were still relatively low in number,
demographic evidence from a sample examination of data from the census carried out
in 1918 throughout Austrian-occupied Albanian areas shows that in the majority of
cases the husband was Roman Catholic and the wife was Muslim, and only in about
10 per cent of the cases was the husband Muslim and the wife Roman Catholic
(Gruber and Pichler, 2002). In the same way conversions to Islam were more frequent
than conversions to Christianity until the early years of the twentieth century, whereas
the tendency today is rather in the other direction. The relative status of Muslims and
Christians is already reversed in local society. The Christians are recognised as the
elite and matrimonial behaviour has accompanied this evolution. Thus religious
identiﬁcations and aﬃliations cannot be objective criteria for deﬁning groups but
rather categories for thinking about groups. They seem essentially to be instrumental
political resources for ascertaining hierarchical relations among social groups and
individuals, with women often used as a currency of exchange.
Women’s Agency
If Le´vi-Strauss is to be taken seriously, we must agree that women are assumed to be
not merely exchange objects linked in a formal power structure but subjects in history
and everyday social life as well. In his kinship theory women are exchanged between
groups of men on the basis of rules of exogamy and prohibition of incest. This form of
matrimonial alliance is assumed to provide communication between separate social
groups and ultimately to ensure the integration of human society as a whole. In this
kind of elementary structure of kinship women are seen as being part of a certain type
of communication, like a ‘speech’ that is misused when they are not exchanged and
‘communicated’. Even though Le´vi-Strauss does not denounce what kinship systems
do to women, there is here something of a contradiction, which amounts to a
recognition of women’s agency, since women ‘speak’ at the same time as they are
‘spoken’, insofar as they are ‘communicated’ in their value quality of signs and they
‘communicate’ in their value quality of producers of signs. To quote Le´vi-Strauss,
. . . A woman could never become just a sign and nothing more, since even in
a man’s world she is still a person, and since insofar as she is deﬁned as a
sign she must be recognized as a generator of signs. In the matrimonial
dialogue of men, a woman is never purely what is spoken about; for if
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women in general represent a certain category of signs, destined to a certain
kind of communication, each woman preserves a particular value arising
from her talent, before and after marriage, for taking her part in a duet. In
contrast to words, which have wholly become signs, woman has remained at
once a sign and a value. This explains why the relations between the sexes
have preserved that aﬀective richness, ardour and mystery which doubtless
originally permeated the entire universe of human communications. (Le´vi-
Strauss, 1967, p. 569; 1969, p. 496)
In the Balkans during Ottoman times, women married to Muslims often retained
their Christian religion and were a factor in creating good feeling between the
members of the two faiths. In Albania in particular, a signiﬁcant role in the
preservation of secret Christianity has been attributed to women (Skendi, 1967;
Malcolm, 2001). In the seventeenth century, when the Catholic population began to
diminish rapidly because of mass conversions to Islam, crypto-Christianity
correspondingly expanded among the Albanians. Missionary reports frequently
describe cases of whole Catholic communities engaging in men-only conversion. This
reﬂects the fact that the main motive for conversion was not at all religious but simply
to escape the additional taxes on Christians, levied by the Ottoman administration
only on the male members of the family. Often the motivation for conversion was not
only ﬁnancial, economic and social but even sheer survival.1 In some cases the new
converts are reported to have taken Christian rather than Muslim women as their
wives, on the grounds that they did not want Christianity to vanish from their homes.
All kinship systems organise kin relations on both the mother’s and the father’s
side, but group membership, names and symbolic resources of identity, including
religion, frequently give priority to one side. However, in a kind of parallel descent
principle for the transmission of group membership and other resources from parents
to children, at this time another common expedient among Albanians was to educate
male children as Muslims, at the father’s request, and female children as Christians, at
the mother’s request. Apparently, this system of religious diﬀerentiation by gender
might be continued over generations, and may thus have been an important
mechanism for maintaining crypto-Christianity. If women in a family were publicly
Christian, it became possible for priests to enter their homes, and there the priests
might minister in secret to the menfolk as well. If gender diﬀerentiation was one key
mechanism in the development of crypto-Christianity, then the other most important
mechanism was priestly complicity.
Women’s agency in eschewing marriage is likewise cited as an unintended side-eﬀect
of ethno-religious aﬃliations. The relatively frequent phenomenon of female celibacy
in the northern Albanian mountains is considered to have been introduced by
Franciscan missionaries in the ﬁrst half of the seventeenth century (Zamputi, 1961;
Dojaka, 1986; Gre´maux, 1992). A report of 1638 by one of the founding fathers of the
Franciscan order in northern Albania reﬂects missionary enthusiasm over what has
been achieved since their arrival in 1635 regarding the chaste or continent marriage
and virginity as a way of life for local people.
It is not impossible that the missionaries’ success in persuading females to embrace
Christian virginity and to remain unattached and chaste throughout their lifetimes
was preconditioned by an existing postponed-marriage system, which allowed females
to experience years of freedom beyond the realms of family and matrimony. In
another, earlier source of 1617 related to Catholic clans in northern Albania, men are
reported to not marry before they are 30 years old and women not before they are 25.
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Actually, young girls did not distinguish themselves from the men, kept their hair cut
short, and used to take an active part in warfare and raiding like men (Zamputi, 1961,
p. 119). In these circumstances virginity as a perpetual state must have lost most of its
ascetic Christian character, and taken on a secularised, active character. The ‘sworn
virgin’ we encounter in customary law, who to some extent was supposed to share
equality with males (Young, 2000), was by no means restricted to Albanian and
Montenegrin Catholics, but was also found among Albanian Muslims and Serbian
Orthodox.
It is argued that customary rules of male succession and property rights have been
the main rationale for women becoming ‘sworn virgins’ in the Balkans. Without at
this time entering into that discussion, one can say that becoming a ‘sworn virgin’ was
the only respectable option for a girl who refused to get married, and the only way of
avoiding a subsequent blood-feud between the families concerned. It is most likely
that throughout the Balkans, especially in the mountain areas, there was for centuries
a minority of females who refused to submit themselves to imposed marriages. Those
who did not manage to avoid an imposed marriage often had extra-marital aﬀairs.
The resulting bloodshed, in its especially North Albanian and Montenegrin forms of
feuding between the male members of the families and larger social units involved, was
often an unintended side-eﬀect of prevailing nuptial practices that failed to account
for female self-determination (Gre´maux, 1992), because much of the internal violence
was provoked by females who refused to submit to the rigid customs concerning
engagement and marriage. In fact, it was in matters of marriage that, according to
North Albanian men, women were most threatening to the social order, and the
negative valuations attributed to women must necessarily reﬂect, in large part, the
trepidation with which men entered aﬃnal relationships (Shryock, 1988).
Female celibacy among North Albanians and Montenegrins probably came into
being as a result of a Franciscan ‘break-in’ to native customary practice in order to
empower women, while receiving its particular character by adaptation to the local
customs of swearing oneself to virginity and of cross-dressing. In the traditional setting,
any change in dress would put the individual involved under enormous pressures to
conform to conventional gender roles expected of his or her original sex. The association
of gender with certain tasks, behaviour patterns and social appearance was so strong
that anyone switching somehow between the two spheres would be socially deﬁned as a
member of the opposite gender. A woman would reject her ascribed gender roles in cases
where she chose to do a man’s work, manage her own household, and move freely
without havale, here meaning without the ‘social veil’ that conﬁned women to the shelter
of the house and courtyard (Backer, 2003), a seclusion that has still been expected from
ordinary housewives until recently despite changes in the position of women.
Among Muslim Albanians since independence in 1912 the Muslim veil has seldom
been worn by women in the towns, even though it has been more widely worn by
women in rural Kosova than in Albania, perhaps because Muslim Kosovars adhere
more to Islam than their counterparts in Albania. Since the 1990s, however, with the
critical turbulent changes of postcommunist transition, there has been a rebirth of
religion in Albania, including adherence to Islam and the return of the veil, in
particular for some young women. However, the word havale, etymologically related
to ‘veil’, is actually not perceived as such in Albanian, but used in the meaning of
‘worry, trouble’. The distinction is important in the expression nuk kam havale, which
means ‘I don’t care’ in a social sense, and is often used rather demonstratively by
younger females, among both Christian and Muslim Albanians, in Kosova and in
Albania, as the unoﬃcial declaration of women’s liberation.
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Along with the rapid social transformations from the middle of twentieth century
onwards, the daily life of Albanians has undergone dramatic changes, especially in
urban settings where westernised families have been rapidly changing their values. In
particular the situation of women is already rapidly changing, even though for certain
categories of women old rules may still be in practice. Whereas present-day Albanian
society is a mixture of modern practices and traditional customs, the price for giving
women their rights is nevertheless much smaller, and today women’s rights are
increasingly acknowledged.
Note
1 In fact, as one of the anonymous peer-reviewers of this paper mentioned, there were also two
big waves of conversions following wars. When Russia went to war against the Ottoman
Empire and the Sublime Porte prevailed, local Orthodox Albanians who had risen up in
revolt against their Ottoman overlords were given the choice between conversion to Islam and
execution. Similarly, when, in the late seventeenth century, local Catholic Albanians rose up
against Istanbul when Austria went to war against the Ottoman Empire, those Catholics
faced the same choice when the Ottomans restored order.
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